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In the first part of her Serious Proposal to the Ladies (1694), Mary Astell ar-
gues that custom and prejudice are the reasons not only behind women’s dis-
advantage in society but also of their vice.1 Astell builds her feminist critique 
on the basis of Cartesian views about human nature and the passions. In its 
most basic form, her argument is that the mind is not gendered, and there-
fore, it is not an innate lack of capacities but rather prejudice which leads to 
women’s position. The arguments she gives in her two Proposals are impor-
tant not only for the feminist agenda they promote but also as an example 
of how a social theory can be built on a foundation of Cartesian philosophy. 
Descartes himself avoided any significant discussion of the social and politi-
cal aspects of his views, with the exception of the “Letter to the Sorbonne” 
that he appended as an introduction to his Meditations, which served to ar-
gue that his arguments were not threatening to the scholastic status quo.2 
Astell’s feminist critique in the Proposals encompasses a number of inter-
related arguments. Broadly, the foundation is an account of human nature 
that reaches two conclusions, first, that the mind is not gendered, and sec-
ond, that the embodied self is. The distinction between the immaterial mind 
and the embodied self is crucial to establishing the social causes of women’s 
position in society. If the mind is not gendered, then at the level of ontology, 
there is no distinction between the thinking parts of men and women. The 
1 Throughout this paper, I will cite Astell’s works by the following abbreviations: SP I – 
Serious Proposal, part I, SP II – Serious Proposal, part II, CR – The Christian Religion, as Pro-
fessed by a Daughter of the Church of England. I will cite Descartes’ work by referring to the 
volume and page number of the Adam and Tannery edition (AT), followed by a reference to 
the English edition edited by Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch given as CSM, followed by 
the volume and page numbers. I cite Descartes’ correspondence with Princess Elisabeth with 
the abbreviation “C” followed by the page number, referring to the edition by Shapiro. I take all 
of the quotations in English from the CSM edition, with the exception of the correspondence 
with Elisabeth, which is  taken from Shapiro. References to the editions used are included 
in the bibliography.
2 we can also consider that Descartes admitted in his conversation with Frans Burman 
that he “does not like writing on ethics” (C 352, AT V 178). This suggests that at least as far as 
his philosophy is concerned, Descartes’ interests end with matters of science and metaphysics 
and not the social implications of these views. Some scholars have attempted to understand 
what Descartes’ political views might be, see, for instance: Richard A. watson, Descartes’s Bal-
let: His Doctrine of the Will and His Political Philosophy (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 
2007); Antonio Negri, Political Descartes: Reason, Ideology and the Bourgeois Project, transl. 
Alberto Toscano, Matteo Mandarini (London: Verso, 2007).
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embodied self  – that is, the self that operates in  the external world via its 
connection to a body (i.e. the embodied aspect of the “embodied self ”) and 
has contact with other human beings – is gendered, which then explains the 
difference in the way men and women are treated. From this, Astell is able to 
explain the symptoms of this difference, particularly the condition women 
are in qua members of society, as a result of the way in which their embod-
ied selves are socialised. Astell illustrates this differential conduct towards 
women most clearly in her analysis of the kinds of passion women cultivate 
and experience. To this end, Astell adopts key aspects of the Cartesian theory 
of the passions, expanding it by showing the social causes of the gendered 
differences in the passions experienced by men and women. Finally, Astell 
draws on one of Descartes’ own methods for moderating the passions – the 
method of judgment – to show that women already have the capacities re-
quired for moderating the passions, and thus striving for virtue. This forms 
the foundation of her call for a women’s educational refuge.
In this paper, I argue that by building on Descartes’ philosophy in the way 
that she does, Astell extends Cartesian philosophy, and in particular the Car-
tesian theory of the passions, into a social theory. That is to say, Astell uses 
Cartesian philosophy to give a theory of the social nature of human embodi-
ment and the effect our social context has on shaping the self. Astell brings 
out and addresses a significant shortcoming in Descartes’ view of the embod-
ied self – his failure to see that it is gendered and becomes so as a result of 
social influences. In extending these ideas not only to a critique of society but 
also to a proposal for a solution, Astell shows the political value of Cartesian 
philosophy as a theoretical backdrop to an egalitarian social theory.3
3 Astell is  not the only early modern philosopher to develop a political theory based 
in Cartesian philosophy. A similar project was developed by François Poulain de la Barre. For 
his Cartesian feminist treatises, see Three Cartesian Feminist Treatises, ed. Marcelle Maistre 
welch (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002) and for an excellent overview of his 
ideas see Siep Stuurman, François Poulain de la Barre and the Invention of Modern Equality 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).
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1. Astell’s View of Human Nature
In the Proposals, Astell highlights that what holds women back in society 
is not an innate lack of ability but rather their lack of access to education, 
usually caused by custom and societal prejudice. In presenting this argument, 
Astell relies on the Cartesian view of the immaterial (and therefore, gender-
less) mind to show that women have the same intellectual capacities as eve-
ryone else.4 At the same time, Astell acknowledges that the embodied self 
is gendered – the kinds of option open to us in life, the kinds of opportunity 
4 Many feminist scholars suggest that Descartes’ view undermines women’s position 
in the world by coding ‘rationality’ as masculine, see for instance Genevieve Lloyd, The Man 
of Reason: “Male” and “Female” in  Western Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minne-
sota Press, 1984). I do not wish to dispute that the Cartesian view has been used in that way, 
however, the view which I defend here is that this was not the case for Astell. As, for instance, 
Jacqueline Broad (Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002)) shows, in the early modern period many women saw Cartesian phi-
losophy as liberating; see also Margaret Atherton, “Cartesian Reason and Gendered Reason”, 
in A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity, eds. Louise M. Antony, 
Charlotte witt (Boulder and Oxford: westview Press, 1993); Ruth Perry, “Radical Doubt and 
the Liberation of women”, Eighteenth-Century Studies 18, 4 (1985): 472–493; Hilda L. Smith, 
Reason’s Disciples: Seventeenth-Century English Feminists (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
1982); Hilda L. Smith, “Intellectual Bases for Feminist Analyses: The Seventeenth and Eigh-
teenth Centuries”, in Women and Reason, eds. Elizabeth D. Harvey, kathleen Okruhlik (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992); katharine M. Rogers, Feminism in  Eighteenth-
Century England (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982). More recently, karen Detlefsen 
(“Cartesianism and Its Feminist Promise and Limits: The Case of Mary Astell”, in Descartes 
and Cartesianism: Essays in Honours of Desmond Clarke, eds. Stephen Gaukroger, Catherine 
wilson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017)) has shown further that this is the case with 
Astell specifically. See also, Joan k. kinnaird, “Mary Astell and the Conservative Contribution 
to English Feminism”, Journal of British Studies 19, 1 (1976): 61–62; Eileen O’Neill, “women 
Cartesians, ‘Feminine Philosophy’, and Historical Exclusion”, in  Feminist Interpretations of 
René Descartes, ed. Susan Bordo (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1999); Ruth Perry, “Mary Astell’s Response to the Enlightenment”, in Women and the Enlight-
enment, eds. Margaret Hunt, Margaret Jacob, Phyliss Mack, Ruth Perry (New York: Institute 
for Research in History and the Haworth Press, 1984); Perry, “Radical Doubt and the Lib-
eration of women”; Jacqueline Broad, “Astell, Cartesian Ethics, and the Critique of Custom”, 
in Mary Astell: Reason, Gender, Faith, eds. william kolbrener, Michal Michelson (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2007); Jacqueline Broad, The Philosophy of Mary Astell: An Early Modern Theory of 
Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
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for learning we get, and thus the kinds of opportunity for our own enlighten-
ment and salvation, all depend on the context in which our embodied selves 
live. Astell writes that “Ignorance and a narrow Education, lay the Foundation 
of Vice, and Imitation and Custom rear it up” (SP I 67). Custom, in particular, 
is at fault for women’s disadvantageous position, it  is “that Tyrant Custom, 
which is the grand motive to all those irrational choices which we daily see 
made in the world, so very contrary to our present interest and pleasure, as 
well as to our Future” (SP I 67–68).5 This suggests, then, that while our mind 
might not be gendered, our embodied self is, and the social context in which 
this self is enculturated impacts on the way in which it develops, and that 
therefore our experience of the world is shaped by this context as well.
The distinction between the mind and the embodied self that I point to 
in Astell’s writing is the same as that drawn out of Descartes’ thought by Deb-
orah Brown between the “minimal” and “maximal” selves.6 By drawing on 
the Sixth Meditation, Brown shows that Descartes uses these two concepts 
to different ends. The minimal self is the mind understood discretely from 
the body; this is the sense in which Descartes explains the self in the Sixth 
Meditation when he writes that “nothing else belongs to my nature or essence 
except that I am a thinking thing” (CSM II 54, AT VII 78). The maximal self 
is the composite of mind and body; this is the sense in which Descartes un-
derstands the self when he writes later in the same text that he is certain that 
his body “or rather [his] whole self, insofar as [he is] a combination of mind 
and body, can be affected by various … bodies which surround it” (CSM II 
56, AT VII 81). Astell likewise maintains this distinction – the minimal self 
for her is the ungendered mind on the basis of which she argues that men 
and women have equal capacities for judgment and virtue, while the maximal 
self is the embodied self, that is, the mind in a substantial union with a body 
5 A number of scholars have considered Astell’s critique of custom and its role in  the 
subjugation of women in detail. See for instance, Broad, “Astell, Cartesian Ethics, and the Cri-
tique of Custom”; karen Detlefsen, “Custom, Freedom, and Equality: Mary Astell on Marriage 
and women’s Education”, in Feminist Interpretations of Mary Astell, eds. Penny A. weiss, Alice 
Sowaal (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2016); Allauren Samantha 
Forbes, “Mary Astell on Bad Custom and Epistemic Injustice”, Hypatia 34, 4 (2019): 777–801.
6 Deborah Brown, “The Sixth Meditation: Descartes and the Embodied Self ”, in  The 
Cambridge Companion to Descartes’ Meditations, ed. David Cunning (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 244–246.
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which is gendered, which forms the basis of her arguments that it is custom 
and prejudice that hold women back in society. 
Some scholars have already noted the Cartesian roots of Astell’s account 
of human nature. For instance, karen Detlefsen observes, “Astell’s equality 
feminism starts from a commitment to a Cartesian ontology of the human, 
specifically his dualism of soul and body according to which the thinking 
soul is the mark of the divine within each of us and is our human essence”.7 At 
the same time, the literature focuses only on the Cartesian minimal self being 
the root of Astell’s view. Detlefsen goes on, in the same passage, to add that 
“while the soul may be embodied during our time on earth, it will eventu-
ally be free from the body after death” (SP I 52–53).8 Since sex is attached to 
bodies and not to souls, women’s human essence is identical with – and thus 
equal to – that of men”. while this reading is undoubtedly correct in identi-
fying Astell’s view with the Cartesian ontology of the human and seeing the 
root of her argument for equality in it, at the same time, this reading only tells 
half of the story. After all, Astell writes that “Humane Nature consists in the 
Union of a Rational Soul with a Mortal Body, that the Body very often Clogs 
the Mind in  its noblest Operations, especially when indulg’d” (SP II 210). 
This suggests that while our mind is bonded to the body, the operations of 
the body have a thorough impact on it. Her critique of society and women’s 
unequal role in it also goes beyond the diagnosis of the problem and seeks 
a solution, which is the eponymous Proposal. 
Astell makes it clear that insofar as we are human beings, we must think of 
ourselves in the maximal sense as embodied beings, that is, as amalgamations 
of mind and body. In the second Proposal she writes that “if we disregard the 
Body wholly, we pretend to live like Angels whilst we are but mortals; and 
7 karen Detlefsen, “Cartesianism and Its Feminist Promise and Limits: The Case of Mary 
Astell”, in  Descartes and Cartesianism: Essays in  Honours of Desmond Clarke, eds. Stephen 
Gaukroger, Catherine wilson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 197.
8 Despite Astell’s clear statements regarding human beings’ embodied nature, and her 
reliance on the distinction between the embodied self and the disembodied mind, which I dis-
cuss in this paper, some scholars have argued that Astell does not have much regard for the 
body and its role in living a good life, see for instance Cynthia Bryson, “Mary Astell: Defender 
of the Disembodied Mind”, Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 13, 4 (1998): 40–62; Cor-
rine Harol, “Mary Astell’s Law of the Heart”, in Mary Astell: Reason, Gender, Faith, eds. william 
kolbrener, Michal Michelson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).
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if we prefer or equal it to the Mind, we degenerate into brutes” (SP II 211). 
It might well be the case that our immaterial minds are not gendered – but we 
nonetheless cannot think of our own nature as disembodied; equally, though 
the body has an impact on the mind, we cannot forget that the mind is ulti-
mately in command of the body. The roles the two substances play in our em-
bodied selves reflect this. For Astell, “the Active powers of the Soul, her will 
and Inclinations are at her own dispose, her Passive are not, she can’t avoid 
feeling Pain or other sensible Impressions so long as she’s united to a Body, 
and that Body is dispos’d to convey these Impressions” (SP II 213–214). The 
soul, as non-extended but rational, is capable of acting, while the body, ex-
tended though non-rational, can merely passively transmit sensations.9 
The influence on the body, and in particular, the gendered differences that 
this imposes onto the development of the mind, can be seen most clearly 
from the vices which Astell diagnoses in women.10 She writes that it  is no 
wonder women appear to be inferior, if they are “nurs’d up in Ignorance and 
Vanity, are taught to be Proud and Petulent, Delicate and Fantastick, Humor-
ous and Inconstant” (SP I 61). Such an upbringing, Astell continues, makes 
it obvious why such vices appear in adulthood (SP I 61). She points to ig-
norance as the cause of these vices and, importantly for my purpose here, 
suggests that these vices are “nothing else but Generosity degenerated and 
corrupted” (SP I 62). Astell understands generosity in  the Cartesian sense, 
that is, as “legitimate self-esteem”.11 Generosity, for Descartes, is also a firm 
9 while it is outside of the scope of this paper, there is a lively debate about what exactly 
Astell thought was the nature of the connection between the mind and body, in particular with 
regard to sensation. See for instance, Derek E. Taylor, “Mary Astell’s Ironic Assault on John 
Locke’s Theory of Thinking Matter”, Journal of the History of Ideas 62, 3 (2001): 505–522; kath-
leen M. Squadrito, “Mary Astell’s Critique of Locke’s View of Thinking Matter”. Journal of the 
History of Philosophy 25, 3 (1987): 433–439; kathleen M. Squadrito, “Mary Astell”, in A History 
of Women Philosophers, 1600–1900, ed. Mary Ellen waithe (Dordrecht: Springer, 1991); Eileen 
O’Neill, “Mary Astell on the Causation of Sensation”, in Mary Astell: Reason, Gender, Faith, eds. 
william kolbrener, Michal Michelson (Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 2007).
10 For a more in-depth discussion of the question of women’s vice in Astell see, Sowaal, 
“Mary Astell and the Development of Vice: Pride, Courtship, and the woman’s Human Na-
ture Question”; Alice Sowaal, “Mary Astell on Liberty”, in  Women and Liberty, 1600–1800: 
Philosophical Essays, eds. Jacqueline Broad, karen Detlefsen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017).
11 Broad, The Philosophy of Mary Astell: An Early Modern Theory of Virtue, 96.
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awareness of our free will and a resolution to use it well, in accordance with 
our best judgements (CSM I 384, AT XI 446). This is  to say then, that for 
Astell vice consists in degenerated self-esteem and not acting on one’s best 
judgements. After all, how can women exercise their judgements if they are 
prevented from an education that would allow them to develop their critical 
abilities? It is therefore unsurprising that Astell writes that women’s supposed 
intellectual “Incapacity, if there be any, is acquired not natural” (SP I 59), and 
it is ingrained primarily by a lack of education (SP I 60). The prejudice against 
women, however, though manifesting as preventing them from acquiring an 
education, really stems from the different ways in which men’s and women’s 
bodies are treated. As Astell shows, the mind is not gendered, which is to say, 
there are no innate differences between the minds of men and women – and 
the difference in treatment in society results therefore from the differences 
in their bodies.12 This is confirmed when Astell suggests that “[w]ere the Men 
as much neglected, and as little care taken to cultivate and improve them, 
perhaps they wou’d be so far from surpassing those whom they now dispise, 
that they themselves wou’d sink into the greatest stupidity and brutality” 
(SP I 57).
Astell’s account of the inequality between men and women is grounded on 
crucial parts of the Cartesian theory of the passions. Vice is an ill-tempered 
passion and emerges from the way in which women’s bodies are enculturated 
and from the lack of education women suffer that could alleviate it. To see 
this clearly, it is now worth looking at how Astell understands the passions, 
and how this understanding shapes her views in the Proposals.
12 This is not to say that Astell did not think that there are no differences in rational capac-
ity between people. For instance, in the second Proposal, she writes that she sees “no reason 
why there may not be as great a variety in Minds as there is in faces” (SP II 153, she repeats this 
in CR 201). The point however is that the differences in rational capacity are not gendered. On 
this, see Detlefsen, “Custom, Freedom, and Equality: Mary Astell on Marriage and women’s 
Education”, 76, who develops this idea further and contrasts it with Descartes, whom she takes 
to hold the position that rational capacities are equal between minds.
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2. Passion, Vice and Virtue
Astell indicates two related sources for her understanding of the passions, 
Descartes and Henry More. In the second Proposal, she writes that she can-
not add anything to what “they have so well Discours’d” (SP II 218).13 Given 
More’s debt to Descartes’ theory, and that in her Christian Religion, as Pro-
fessed by a Daughter of the Church of England (1705), Astell likewise refers to 
Descartes’ taxonomy of the passions (CR 196–199), there is good reason to 
say she is employing and building on the Cartesian view.14 Astell gives a clear 
statement of her understanding of the passions in the fourth chapter of the 
second Proposal. Here, she tells us that they are those perceptions in the soul 
that are caused by commotions of the blood and animal spirits (SP II 214). 
we are passive with regard to them – a person is “no more able to prevent 
these first Impressions than she is to stop the Circulation of the Bloud, or to 
hinder Digestion” (SP II 214). Our options concerning the passions are to let 
them run their course, to shift them to another object, or to try to modify 
them in  some way; the latter of these options being what Astell defines as 
a virtue, which according to her, consists in “governing Animal Impressions, 
in directing our Passions to such Objects, and keeping ‘em at such a pitch, as 
right Reasons requires” (SP II 214).15 
Like Descartes, Astell suggests that the passions can be beneficial and 
pleasant. She considers them to be “natural and unavoidable”, and their use 
to be motivating us to act in various ways, according to “the Determination 
of the Mind” (SP II 214).16 Like Descartes, Astell also thinks this is part of 
13 For a direct comparison between Astell and More, see Broad, “Astell, Cartesian Ethics, 
and the Critique of Custom”.
14 In her annotations to this text, Jacqueline Broad points to the fact that Astell supple-
ments Descartes’ taxonomy with More’s, see CR pp. 196–7, fn.45. 
15 In the Christian Religion, Astell writes that “reason conducted by grace” must command 
the passions if we are to live a “virtuous religious life” (CR 245); Broad traces this formula-
tion of the definition of virtue to Charles Hickman’s Fourteen Sermons Preached, at St James’s 
Church in Westminster (CR 245 fn.248).
16 This suggests Astell’s understanding of the passions is  that they are motivational 
and not representational. A similar reading of the Cartesian view is  defended for instance 
by Sean Greenberg (“Descartes on the Passions: Function, Representation and Motivation”, 
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the problem with the passions – if we are not careful, they will suggest the 
wrong course of action. Astellian virtue consists in training the passions to 
remain within limits set by reason. This, she writes, “is what we can and ought 
to do, and if we do not perform it, we act rather like the Slaves of Sense than 
Creatures endued with Reason; but if we do, we can hardly receive any Injury 
from the Passions” (SP II 214). Finally, like Descartes, Astell writes that the 
passions depend in many ways on the make-up of the body. She tells us that 
the passions depend on “the Constitution of the Body, Age, Education, and 
way of Living”, and that, therefore, the same external object affects different 
people differently (SP II 216). 
The Cartesian passion of generosity is  the foundation of Astell’s under-
standing of vice and virtue. Descartes defined it as a species of wonder (CSM 
I 350, AT XI 373), which can maximise our self-esteem, and which consists 
of knowing that we have free will and of having the resolution to use our will 
in accordance with our best judgements (CSM I 384, AT XI 445–6). For him, 
generosity is the focal point of our moral practice – by cultivating generos-
ity we are able to bring all of the other passions in line, which is why it is the 
“remedy against all the disorders of the passions” (CSM I 385, AT XI 447). 
More’s definition of generosity in his Account of Virtue is similar. He writes 
that in generosity, “a Man exercise his own freedom and liberty of Thinking 
in the best manner he can; that he rest contented hereto; and as to Fortune, 
and the world’s Opinion, to look on them as things of indifferency; yet still 
to regard all Men with Civility, and to suppose them what they ought to be, 
till the contrary be made manifest”.17 More and Descartes both agree that 
generosity consists in the firm knowledge that nothing belongs to us but the 
free exercise of our will. 
Astell’s understanding of generosity follows the Cartesian path. She in-
cluded a short discourse on generosity in  a 1714 letter to her friend, Ann 
Coventry. According to Jacqueline Broad,18 this is  doubtlessly John Som-
Noûs 4 (2007): 714–734) and Shoshana Brassfield (“Never Let the Passions be Your Guide: 
Descartes and the Role of the Passions”, British Journal of the History of Philosophy 20, 3 (2012): 
459–477).
17 Henry More, An Account of Virtue: or, Dr. Henry More’s Abridgment of Morals, transl. 
Edward Southwell (London: Benjamin Tooke, 1690), 143.
18 Broad, The Philosophy of Mary Astell: An Early Modern Theory of Virtue, 105.
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ers’ A Discourse concerning Generosity (1693), a Cartesian text examining 
generosity in detail. In  the letter, Astell laments that it  is  the “common lot 
of all those Generous Persons who have gone before us” to be “extinguish’d” 
by the envy and ill-nature of others. According to her, the generous, that is, 
“all who make a Right use of their Liberty, endeavouring to do always what 
is Best”, have no choice but to submit to this treatment, or even “[be] Glo-
ried in” the circumstances they face.19 The wording Astell uses to describe 
the generous person fits Descartes’ own description. In the second Proposal, 
she elaborates to say that “the Author of our nature” has given us the tools 
sufficient to face any of the difficulties of this life, “One of these is Generosity, 
which (so long as we keep it from degenerating into Pride) is of admirable 
advantage to us in this matter” (SP II 141). Generosity, along with courage, 
is also necessary to “throw off Sloth and to Conquer the Prejudices of Edu-
cation, Authority and Custom” (SP II 140). This is to say generosity is at the 
centre of Astell’s programme of moral development. 
Generosity is also central to Astell for the influence it has on a person’s 
self-esteem. kathleen Ahearn writes that Astell’s task of assisting women 
in overcoming their “groveling Spirit” (SP II 232) requires the kind of proper 
management of the passions to achieve virtue and happiness that Descartes’ 
theory of the passions is made for.20 Specifically, Descartes holds that gener-
osity “causes a person’s self-esteem to be as great as it may legitimately be” 
(CSM I 384, AT XII 445). Astell recognises this when she describes the “femi-
nine vices” as “nothing else but Generosity degenerated and corrupted” (SP 
I 62). This degradation of women is caused by being in a society where the 
custom is to mock and degrade them.21 In other words, society, by the way 
it treats women in their embodiment, causes them to degenerate into a cycle 
of vice, from which they cannot easily escape. This being the case, it is not 
merely women’s generosity that is affected by custom, but all of their passions. 
19 Ruth Perry, The Celebrated Mary Astell (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1986), 370–371.
20 kathleen A. Ahearn, “Mary Astell’s Account of Feminine Self-Esteem”, in Feminist In-
terpretations of Mary Astell, eds. Alice Sowaal, Penny A. weiss (University Park: The Pennsyl-
vania State University Press, 2016), 36.
21 Alice Sowaal, “Mary Astell’s Serious Proposal: Mind, Method, and Custom”, Philosophy 
Compass 2, 2 (2007): 232.
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The focus on the role of self-esteem and generosity in the production of 
virtue and vice in women is telling of the importance of understanding the 
distinction between the minimal and maximal self in Astell’s thought. The 
minimal self is the foundation of her critique: fundamentally, women’s minds 
taken on their own, as distinct from their bodies, are indistinguishable from 
those of men. Therefore, men and women ought to be treated equally. This 
being the case, Astell anticipates an objection: if men and women have equal 
minds, why do women appear as inferior? Astell’s response is cashed out by 
showing the impact embodiment has on the mind. The passions occur in the 
mind as a result of its close connection to the body. If vice is the product of 
ill-tempered passions, then reasonably one can conclude that the actual cause 
of women’s seeming inferiority is the way how their embodied selves are en-
culturated and socialised. This is to say, Astell’s argument is that women as 
embodied and socially situated agents suffer from unique disadvantages that 
are the product of their bodies being treated differently to men’s bodies. By 
being deprived of the ability to gain an education and by being enculturated 
to value things such as beauty or money (SP I 62), women are made to be-
come inferior to men.
In making these arguments, Astell builds significantly on Descartes’ theory 
of the passions. Both authors agree that the passions affect people differently 
at different ages (CSM I 374, AT XI 426, SP II 216) and that the passions can 
differ in people depending on their life experience (e.g. CSM I 376, AT XI 
429, SP II 216). However, what is missing in Descartes’ theory of the passions 
is an understanding of how men and women differ in their experience, and 
thus of the role the gendered context of their embodiment has on develop-
ing their passions. The closest he comes to understanding the influence of 
social context on the passions is in a passing remark to Elisabeth in a letter 
dated 18 May 1645, where commenting on a persistent “low-grade fever”, he 
writes that “the stubbornness of fortune in persecuting your house continu-
ally gives you matters for annoyance which are so public and so terrible that 
it is necessary neither to conjecture very much nor to be particularly experi-
enced in social matters to judge that the principal cause of your indisposition 
consists in these” (C 86, AT IV 200). This is to say, Descartes recognises that 
Elisabeth’s social context has had a pronounced effect on her passions and 
bodily health. However, this is not yet an acknowledgement that the kinds of 
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passion we experience in response to everyday events are shaped by our so-
cial context. Astell makes this point much more explicitly by linking custom 
and social prejudice directly to the kinds of passion women develop. Vice, 
which Astell defines in terms of corrupted passions, is caused, in her view, by 
the social conditions women are brought up under and have to live in. These 
conditions affect the mind via its close connection to the body; that is, they 
influence women’s maximal selves. 
Our social context also matters in  another way for developing our pas-
sions and virtue. Namely, Astell considers friendship to be a necessary part 
of tempering our passions. In  the first Proposal, she writes that friendship 
is worth more than all other pleasures (SP I 75), that it is “without doubt the 
best Instructor to teach us our duty to our Neighbour” and that it “has a spe-
cial force to dilate our hearts, to deliver them from that vicious selfishness 
and the rest of those sordid Passions which express a narrow, illiberal temper” 
(SP I 99). She proposes that friendship can grant women “those perfections 
[their] feigned lovers pretended [they] had, and kept [them] from obtaining” 
(SP I 74). Given the benefits of friendship and the key role it plays in women’s 
moral development, it  is unsurprising that Astell suggests that in the sanc-
tuary she proposes, women “shall have the opportunity of contracting the 
purest and noblest Friendship” (SP I 98). Friends can help steer us toward 
the right path, but more importantly, the passages quoted here show that true 
friends establish a social context in which we are no longer subject to the 
prejudices and customs which are harmful to us. This is  to say, friendship 
provides the proper social context for our moral development and allows the 
embodied self to be free of those influences which degenerate our passions 
into vice.22
22 A number of contemporary scholars have considered Astell’s view of friendship more 
closely, see Jacqueline Broad, “Mary Astell on Virtuous Friendship”, Parergon 26, 2 (2009): 
65–86; Nancy kendrick, “Mary Astell’s Theory of Spiritual Friendship”, British Journal for the 
History of Philosophy 26, 1 (2017): 46–65; william kolbrener, “Astell’s ‘Design of Friendship’ 
in Letters and A Serious Proposal, Part I”, in Mary Astell: Reason, Gender, Faith, eds. william 




Having considered the roots of Astell’s critique of women’s position in so-
ciety, and her view of the effect of this position on the development of wom-
en’s moral character, I now turn to analysing the positive solution she of-
fers. Astell emphasises in many places in her work that she thinks philosophy 
and education ought to be practical. She tells her readers that “it is to little 
purpose to Think well and speak well, unless we Live well” (SP II 199) and 
that “Truths merely Speculative and which have no influence upon Practice, 
which neither contribute to the good of Soul or Body are but idle Amuse-
ments, an impertinent and criminal wast of Time” (SP II 143). what then 
should we take to be the practical goal of philosophy?
Jacqueline Broad understands it to be emancipation, which, on her read-
ing of Astell, “consists in  liberating the will from the ‘manacle’ of custom 
(SP II 139); freedom is freedom of the will rather than freedom from bodily 
constraint”.23 This is  to say, Broad understands the target to be an intellec-
tual liberation for women from the oppressive shackles imposed upon them 
by society via custom and lack of educational opportunities. Astell gives us 
good reasons to think that, for her, intellectual emancipation is inseparable 
from reforming the way in which women qua embodied minds are treated 
and enculturated. As I have shown above, Astell characterises the vices which 
emerge from women’s position in society as degenerated passions. The libera-
tion of women’s minds, therefore, requires the liberation of women’s bodies 
from unequal treatment in  society. Astell’s proposal stems from this basic 
premise. Astell calls for the establishment of a women’s only school, where 
women can be educated and therefore cultivate better judgements. If Astell’s 
point were to liberate only women’s minds, then it would be unclear why she 
would not advocate for women’s equal access to education within existing in-
stitutions. Astell’s goal, however, is broader than that: it is to liberate women’s 
minds qua embodied minds. As such, women would not benefit (at least, not 
23 Jacqueline Broad, “Mary Astell and the Virtues”, in  Feminist Interpretations of Mary 
Astell, eds. Alice Sowaal, Penny A. weiss (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 2016), 22.
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at first) from equal access to educational facilities with men, since then, their 
bodies would still be treated as women’s bodies – that is, they would face the 
same ingrained prejudice and custom that prevents them from being able to 
acquire an education in the first place. 
The educational facility Astell wants to establish serves two general goals, 
“the service of GOD and improvement of [women’s] own Minds” (SP I 73). 
To fulfil the first of these goals, Astell thinks we need to cultivate the passion 
of love with God as its object. In this, Astell makes her most significant depar-
ture from Descartes’ theory of the passions by shifting the focus away from 
generosity as the key to controlling the passions.24 She defines love similarly 
to Descartes, as “a motion of the Soul to joyn it self to that which appears 
to be grateful to it” (SP II 219, compare CSM I 356, AT XI 387), writes that 
it “seems to be the predominant passion in every one” (SP II 219), and sug-
gests that love is “at the bottom of all the Passions” and indeed that “one wou’d 
think they’re nothing else but different Modifications of it” (SP II 219). Given 
this, Astell argues that if we direct our love appropriately, the rest of our pas-
sions will follow. She writes in the second Proposal that “If therefore our Love 
be Right, the rest of our Passions will of course be so” and that it  is “GOD 
who is  the only proper and adequate Object of our Love” (SP II 219). The 
service of God thus has two benefits: first, it helps us regulate our behaviour 
by providing a measure by shifting the goals of our actions towards seeking 
divine approbation (SP II 220), second, it helps us regulate our passions, since 
ordering our passions right, by cultivating the love of God above all else, leads 
the rest of the passions to follow (SM II 219). By the second goal, improv-
ing women’s minds, Astell understands helping women overcome ignorance, 
24 In this, Astell is doubtlessly influenced by Malebranche and Norris, who similarly shift 
the focus of the Cartesian theory of the passions. This is also not the only departure she makes 
from the Cartesian view, for instance, Broad argues that in the Christian Religion Astell talks 
of completely eliminating certain passions, such as pride, anger, hatred, and overwhelming 
sorrow, as the gospel commands us to “‘put off all these’ of what kind so ever, assuring us 
that such sinful ‘flesh and blood can’t inherit the kingdom of God’” (CR 252). Broad argues 
that this suggests that for Astell there are some passions that are not useful and ought to be 
discarded (Broad, The Philosophy of Mary Astell: An Early Modern Theory of Virtue, 89). This 
ambivalence about certain passions is shared by Astell and Malebranche. Broad sees in Astell 
echoes of the Malebranchean view that the body tyrannizes the mind and tears it away from 
God (Broad, The Philosophy of Mary Astell: An Early Modern Theory of Virtue, 89).
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which she understands as the “cause of most Feminine Vices” (SP I 62) and as 
originating “from a want of understanding to compare and judge of things, to 
chuse a right End, to proportion the Means to the End, and to rate ev’ry thing 
according to its proper value” (SP I 64). The two goals for the women’s retreat 
are not mutually exclusive – cultivating the passions goes hand in hand with 
cultivating our judgements. Ultimately, Astell thinks both of these things 
are necessary before women can be considered equal participants in  soci-
ety, she writes, “… it  is fit we Retire a little, to furnish our Understandings 
with useful Principles, to set our Inclinations right, and to manage our Pas-
sions, and when this is well done, but not till then, we may safely venture out” 
(SP II 232). That Astell thinks the goals she has in mind for women’s educa-
tion can only be best achieved in a women’s retreat shows that she under-
stands that the social context under which our embodied self develops mat-
ters. The proposal, then, is to establish a space where the social context is not 
harmful, but rather is beneficial, to women’s development.
As far as the practice of refining women’s judgements is concerned, prima 
facie Astell adopts the same solution as Descartes, Malebranche and Norris. 
That is, like them, Astell argues that cultivating and sharpening our judge-
ments is the solution to the disarray of the passions, and it is by doing so that 
we can come to acquire generosity (or rather, in Astell’s case, save it  from 
being degenerated). More specifically, as Broad shows, Astell relies on the 
developmental program proposed by John Norris in  his Reflections on the 
Conduct of Human Life (1697), which consists of three parts: developing our 
judgements (using his rules for thinking), developing purity of “Heart and 
Life”, and prayer.25 Astell refers her readers to Norris’ “course of study” in the 
first Proposal (SP I 78) and adopts the recommendation of the necessity of 
purity for moral development in the second (SP II 131).
Astell outlines the method she prescribes for cultivating judgements as 
a set of six rules (SP II 176–178), deviating slightly from Norris:
25 Broad, The Philosophy of Mary Astell: An Early Modern Theory of Virtue, 33. See also, 
Norris (“Reflections on the Conduct of Human Life: with Reference to the Study of Learning 
and knowledge”, in Treatuses Upon Several Subjects (London: S. Manship, 1697), 75–81) for his 
own description of the method.
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1.  Acquaint our selves thoroughly with the State of the Question, have 
a Distinct Notion of our Subject whatever it be, and of the Terms we 
make use of, knowing precisely what it is we drive at.
2.  Cut off all needless Ideas and whatever has not a necessary Connexion 
to the matter under Consideration.
3.  To conduct our Thoughts by Order, beginning with the most Simple 
and Easie Objects, and ascending as by Degrees to the knowledge of 
the more Compos’d.
4.  Not to leave any part of our Subject unexamin’d.
5.  Always keep our Subject Directly in our Eye, and Closely pursuye it thro 
all, our Progress.
6.  To judge no further than we Perceive, and not to take any thing for 
Truth, which we do not evidently know to be so.
The first three of these rules are the same as those given by Malebranche 
in his Search After Truth,26 and which were later summarised by Norris.27 As-
tell’s rules also harken to those given by Pierre Nicole and Antoine Arnauld 
in their Logic, or the Art of Thinking, a work Astell cites several times through-
out her Proposal.28 Ultimately, all of these thinkers base their rules on those 
Descartes set out in part 2 of his Discourse on the Method (CSM I 120, AT VI 
18–19).29 The most important thing that Astell’s rules share with the other 
Cartesians, and Descartes himself is their purpose – namely, combatting ig-
norance in the service of moderating the passions and cultivating virtue.
Astell writes that ignorance leads to most vices (SP I 62) and that it is the 
“Foundation of Vice” that is  backed up by custom and prejudice (SP 
I 67). Overcoming ignorance, however, is not as simple as perfecting one’s 
26 Nicholas Malebranche, The Search After Truth and Elucidations, eds. Thomas M. Len-
non, Paul J. Olscamp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 438.
27 Norris, “Reflections on the Conduct of Human Life: with Reference to the Study of 
Learning and knowledge”, 205–208.
28 For Arnauld and Nicole (Logic, or the Art of Thinking, ed. and transl. Jill V. Buroker 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)) discussion of Descartes’ rules, see p. 238 of 
the Logic, and for their discussion of their own rules, see p. 259. 
29 For a closer comparison of the similarities and differences between the sets of rules 
articulated by Descartes, Malebranche, Norris, and Arnauld and Nicole, see Sowaal, “Mary As-
tell’s Serious Proposal: Mind, Method, and Custom”: 227–243; Broad, The Philosophy of Mary 
Astell: An Early Modern Theory of Virtue, 31–33.
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understanding. Astell writes that knowledge must be paired with the purity 
of character. She writes that the woman “who desires a clear Head must have 
a pure Heart; and she who has the first in any Measure will never allow herself 
to be deficient in the other” (SP II 127). The reason for this is that “the Cor-
ruption of the Heart” contributes more to our ignorance than the “Clearness 
of our Light” does to the regularity of our affections (SP II 130). Norris30 de-
scribes purity as consisting in chastity and temperance and suggests that its 
purpose is to help “clarify the medium” – that is the body – which is clouded 
by the passions, particularly by the desire of terrestrial things. In sum, Astell 
highlights two opposites – on the one hand ignorance, on the other the regu-
larity of our affections. In other words – the ultimate purpose of education, 
if it is to lead to virtue (i.e. away from ignorance), is the regulation of our pas-
sions. Achieving this goal requires not only good judgements (i.e. knowledge) 
but also the purity of heart. As far as training our judgements goes, as we have 
seen, Astell employs the rules for judgement drawn from Malebranche and 
Norris, Nicole and Arnauld, but ultimately rooted in Descartes’ epistemol-
ogy. By drawing on Norris’ notion of purity, Astell highlights the inadequacy 
of training our judgements as separate from other aspects of our lives.
Given the genderless nature of the disembodied mind, and thus the 
equal potential for moral development that men’s and women’s minds hold, 
it is worth considering why exactly the above method could not be attained 
in a co-educational facility. As Penny weiss shows, Astell’s goal is not here to 
replicate the conditions men enjoy in their education, as if they were fault-
less.31 Rather, Astell’s analysis of the socially conditioned nature of moral de-
velopment leads her to recognise the inequality in power men and women 
face in  society. In  an educational context, this would mean that women 
qua embodied minds would still be treated according to the custom which 
treats their female bodies poorly. Astell notes that the conditioning to cus-
tom happens from childhood (SP I 60). Therefore, a co-educational facility 
30 Norris, “Reflections on the Conduct of Human Life: with Reference to the Study of 
Learning and knowledge”, 211.
31 Penny A. weiss, “From the Throne to Every Private Family: Mary Astell as Analyst of 
Power”, in Feminist Interpretations of Mary Astell, eds. Alice Sowaal, Penny A. weiss (Univer-
sity Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2017).
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would perpetuate the inequality between men and women instead of provid-
ing women with the space to develop as virtuous moral agents in their own 
right.32
Conclusion
This paper shows that Astell’s philosophy, and in particular, the key parts 
of her feminist philosophical program take Cartesian philosophy as their 
starting point. She follows Descartes’ ontology of the human to show that the 
mind has no gender. However, our bodies are gendered, which means that so 
is our embodied self. From here, Astell is able to show that those things that 
are vices for women – especially those related to the passions, come from the 
way in which women’s bodies are socialised, this is to say, our passions are 
socially determined because in society men’s and women’s bodies are treated 
differently. This is a significant development on the Cartesian theory of the 
self, which brings out and addresses a shortcoming in Descartes’ theory – 
namely, the lack of attention paid to the fact that social context supervenes 
on the development of the self. In  addressing this, I show Astell does not 
reject the Cartesian view but elaborates on it by showing that it is custom and 
prejudice which lead to women’s position in society.
The solution Astell proposes to address this societal inequality likewise re-
lies on the Cartesian theory of the passions. Her innovation here is, again, 
to build a feminist social theory on top of the Cartesian view of the pas-
sions. In her recognition that social context shapes the self and the passions, 
she proposes an educational refuge for women. It must be for women only, 
since only by removing the social context in  which women are customar-
ily neglected (i.e. treated not as embodied minds, but as women) can they 
overcome the limitations imposed by bad custom. The refuge would provide 
women with a space to train their passions and refine their judgements so 
32 See also Forbes, “Mary Astell on Bad Custom and Epistemic Injustice”, for an analysis of 
how structural inequality and custom manifest as an epistemic injustice in preventing women 
from being able to fully exercise their epistemic powers.
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that they might be set on a path to developing virtue. In other words, the 
refuge would apply to the Cartesian moral program as women’s education.
Astell’s multifaceted philosophical work thus shows two things. First, 
a Cartesian diagnosis and solution to the problem of women’s unequal place 
in society, and second, the political potential held by Cartesian philosophy, 
and especially the theory of the passions.
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